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Andrew L. Kaufman** 
When I started to prepare this talk, I realized that of all the 
Cardozo talks I have given since I completed my book 22 years ago, 
this one was unique because the audience is unique. I can presume 
some familiarity with my subject matter and so I can focus on rather 
different things from what I usually talk about. 
I thought I could do that best by starting with some biographer 
stories. I took so long completing the Cardozo book that enough things 
occurred along the way that I could make up a book of interesting back 
stories. The first involves a Touro connection, Chief Judge Sol 
Wachtler. I learned early on in my researches that the Court of Appeals 
had a collection of 600 memoranda circulated to the court by Cardozo 
in matters originally destined to be handled per curiam. Five 
successive chief judges – Conway, Desmond, Fuld, Breitel, and Cooke 
– understandably refused me permission to see them on the ground that 
they were written as confidential documents solely for the other 
judges. Not long before I finished my manuscript I paid a visit to Chief 
Judge Wachtler. His attitude was that the court should be helping me, 
not hindering me, and he persuaded the court to let me see them. I only 
had to show the court what use I made of them. Eventually, I submitted 
them to Chief Judge Kaye who not only read the sections of the book 
that use those memos but she also read the whole manuscript for me 
and commented on various parts.  
While I was in Chief Judge Wachtler’s office, he told me the 
following story on himself. He pointed to his desk and said it had been 
Cardozo’s desk. And then he said that he had shown the same desk to 
 
*This is a slightly edited version of the keynote address given at the Touro Cardozo conference. 
The talk itself is a much abridged version of a video presentation prepared as part of a legal 
history series created in 2017 to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the founding of the Harvard 
Law School. The expanded talk may be found at http://200.hls.harvard.edu/talks/harvardx/. 
**Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  
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a visitor who responded that after Wachtler had finished using it, the 
desk would still be “Cardozo’s desk.”  I am sure that wherever that 
desk is today, it is still “Cardozo’s desk.” 
One of the first things I did when I began research was to try to 
talk to people who had known Cardozo personally. There weren’t too 
many still around because Cardozo had been dead for almost 20 years 
when I started work in 1957. One was Charles Burlingham, who was 
then thought of not only as the dean of the New York bar but also as a 
behind the scenes judgemaker. He was influential not only in putting 
Cardozo on the bench and advancing Cardozo’s judicial career but he 
also did the same for Learned Hand and others. Burlingham was 99 
and blind when I interviewed him but his mind was still exceedingly 
sharp. When the interview was over, he told me to shake his hand. 
After I did so, he said that I had now shaken the hand of a man who 
had shaken hands with Abraham Lincoln. Burlingham’s father was an 
inspector of the Union’s Sanitary Commission during the Civil War. 
He took his six-year old son Charles with him to Washington for a 
Commission meeting in 1865 and Charles had gotten to shake the 
President’s hand. (After lunch, you may shake my hand if you’d like 
to shake the hand of a man who shook the hand of a man who shook 
hands with Abraham Lincoln.)  
One mystery while I was writing the book was the sound of 
Cardozo’s voice. Although he spoke to me constantly during the 38 
years I worked on the book – usually saying “what’s taking you so long 
– get on with it,” I had been puzzled by descriptions of the enthusiastic 
reactions to Cardozo presentations. They were hard to square with the 
other contemporaneous descriptions of a “gentle, modest, self 
deprecating Cardozo.”  Just before I turned in the manuscript for my 
biography, David Warrington, head of Special Collections in the 
Harvard Law School library, who knew that I was looking for a 
recording of his voice, saw that the Library of Congress had just 
acquired a wax recording that had been made of a talk given by 
Cardozo in 1931 at a dinner to honor Nicholas Murray Butler, the 
president of Columbia University. But when I got a copy of that record 
and listened to Cardozo’s quite mundane remarks on that occasion, I 
was just blown away. I could have been listening to William Jennings 
Bryan himself.  Cardozo was an orator in the 19th century style.  And 
I understood immediately why he was such a captivating speaker, and 
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also why he had been such an effective trial and appellate lawyer – 
because he just had the most marvelous speaking voice.1  
The shelf life of judicial reputation is short. How many judges 
from 100 years ago can anyone, even a lawyer, recall, except perhaps 
as a name? Benjamin Nathan Cardozo is an exception.  He is one of 
the very few judges of that era whose name currently means something 
to the legal profession and beyond. Unlike any other contemporary, he 
is still remembered for his career as a state court judge and also, albeit 
somewhat less, for his career on the United States Supreme Court. The 
messages he left behind, in both his judicial and his extrajudicial 
writing, still resonate today. 
Benjamin Cardozo lived for the law and the law made him 
famous. I have time for just a few highlights from his life as a human 
being – as a lawyer for 23 years, and as a judge for another 23 years. 
His heritage was an important part of his life. Benjamin took pride in 
the fact that his Cardozo and Nathan ancestors arrived in New York 
before the Revolution and that their synagogue, Shearith Israel, the 
Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue, was already over 125 years old 
when the Revolutionary War was won. Its rabbi, Gershom Seixas, was 
the first Jewish trustee of the college that was to become Columbia 
University. Benjamin Cardozo would be the second. His uncle, 
Benjamin Nathan, for whom he was named, was a Vice-President of 
the New York Stock Exchange. In Benjamin Cardozo’s generation, 
one first cousin, Emma Lazarus, was the author of the poem that graces 
the base of the Statue of Liberty; another first cousin, Maud Nathan, 
was a well-known suffragist, social reformer, and president for thirty 
years of the Consumer’s League of New York; and yet a third first 
cousin, Annie Nathan Meyer, was a playwright and the founder of 
Barnard College. The Cardozos, the Nathans, and other Sephardic 
Jews were well established in this country economically and even 
politically and socially when the waves of immigration from Central 
and then Eastern Europe began in the last third of the nineteenth 
century. Small wonder that they considered themselves the aristocracy 
of American Jewry.   
Cardozo’s growing up years were shadowed by the experience 
of his father, one of Boss Tweed’s Tammany judges, who resigned 
from the bench just as he was about to be impeached for corruption by 
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the legislature. Although his father returned to the practice of the law, 
the family disgrace surely had an impact. Cardozo had a private tutor 
who tutored him for two years from the age of thirteen for the entrance 
exam to Columbia. The tutor’s name was Horatio Alger, the Horatio 
Alger of rags to riches literature who earned a living, in part, by 
tutoring the children of the wealthy. Earlier in his life he had been 
dismissed from his position as a minister for sexually abusing children 
of his congregation. No evidence exists of subsequent misconduct 
either with his many tutees or with the large numbers of homeless 
street boys whom he subsidized, but of course the question remains. 
Cardozo’s youth ended with his career at Columbia, which he 
entered at age 15, the youngest in his class. He lived at home with his 
twin sister, two older sisters, and an older brother who was practicing 
law in their father’s firm. Benjamin’s mother had died when he was 
nine and his father died during Benjamin’s first year at college. 
Benjamin did not participate much in the social life of the school. He 
worked hard, did very well, won several prizes, and went straight from 
college into Columbia Law School. The instruction there consisted 
mostly of lectures about the rules and doctrines of law without much 
analysis. The Socratic method of questioning students and analyzing 
doctrine critically that was associated with the Harvard Law School of 
Christopher Langdell arrived at Columbia Law School during 
Cardozo’s second year. He did not much take to it. Columbia had 
recently added a third year of study, but Cardozo, along with two-thirds 
of his class, left at the end of his second year. He was not yet 21. 
Cardozo was admitted to the bar as soon as he reached 21. He 
joined his brother in their father’s politically-oriented firm, and began 
practicing law. Almost immediately, he began to make a name for 
himself, arguing several cases in the New York Court of Appeals in 
the first years of his practice. The practice of law was very different 
then from what it has become. The bar was relatively small, and most 
major firms had just a few partners. A good lawyer could make his 
(and they were virtually all “his”) way quickly, and Benjamin Cardozo 
established himself as a good lawyer very early in his career.  
Early success also imbued him with a self-confidence that 
demonstrated itself at a crucial moment in the history of his 
congregation. While Cardozo was still a young lawyer, he made a 
dramatic appearance at Shearith Israel.  The efforts of German Reform 
Judaism throughout much of the nineteenth century to “modernize” 
Jewish religious traditions and practices had been increasingly 
4
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successful in the United States. The “modernization” issue was raised 
at Shearith Israel at a congregational meeting in 1895 in the context of 
a motion to end gender-segregated seating. The minutes of the meeting 
record matter of factly that four speeches in support of the motion were 
made, all by Cardozo’s close relatives, and that Dr. Mendes, the 
preacher, and another spoke in opposition. The minutes then 
characterize a final speech by Benjamin Cardozo as “a long address, 
impressive in ability and eloquence.” The progressive judge would 
support bringing the practices of the congregation into the modern era, 
right? Wrong. He argued that the principle of the separation of the 
sexes was embodied in the synagogue’s Constitution because that 
document specifically forbade any boy from entering the women’s 
gallery. A vote by the electors to adopt the motion would violate that 
Constitution. Cardozo warned that if that was done, there were laws 
outside the synagogue to which the opponents could turn. The electors 
then rejected the motion overwhelmingly.   
There were three notable features to this event: that Cardozo 
appeared, that he spoke, and that he spoke in opposition to the motion 
to end segregated seating. He had long been absent from religious 
services in the synagogue. Moreover, his father, a man of prominence 
in the Sephardic community, had lived out his life in disgrace after 
resigning from the bench. It therefore took a strong sense of self, some 
chutzpah, for the twenty-five-year-old Cardozo to have taken a 
leadership position on this issue. The incident certainly demonstrates 
that in a few short years of professional life the young man, who had 
been perceived as a shy and aloof student at Columbia, had gained an 
enormous public presence. It is apparent that the shyness concealed a 
self-confidence that came forth very early in his professional career. It 
also demonstrates that although Cardozo had ceased to engage in the 
practice of the Jewish faith, he had not fled his Jewish heritage.  He 
thought of himself as a Jew to the point where he returned in a moment 
of crisis, not to pray, but to uphold a major formal feature of the 
religious practice of his Congregation. 
The court records from his years at the bar show a very active 
trial and appellate practice. As time went on and he demonstrated his 
ability, more and more lawyers referred their important or difficult 
cases to him. His practice was largely oriented toward commercial and 
family matters. Modern-style brief writing was not yet well 
established. Many, perhaps most, briefs consisted of conclusory 
arguments coupled with citation of, and quotation from, relevant cases. 
5
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Cardozo immediately adopted the modern, more useful style that 
began with a statement of the facts and the questions to be decided and 
then went on to argument based on critical analysis of doctrine and 
policy supporting the desired result. When the policy arguments were 
not strong, Cardozo argued from the facts, and he could make technical 
arguments with the best. In short, he used the best available 
ammunition to support his case that he could find, and he argued 
persuasively, and with style.   
Cardozo’s skill as a lawyer was not solely in the setting of the 
appellate courts; he was also a fine trial lawyer. His approach was that 
of an advocate, not an academic. And what an advocate! Cardozo was 
a tiger, who would attack the opposition with every weapon at hand – 
the facts, the law, technicalities, humor, sarcasm, even barbs directed 
at the parties, witnesses, and counsel on the other side. His ability and 
his connections in the Sephardic community brought him business, and 
most of his business consisted of difficult matters that were referred to 
him first by his Jewish friends and later by a wider circle of New York 
lawyers.  
Although, with time, the matters he handled involved larger 
sums of money and his practice became more varied, he never became 
a Brandeis-type lawyer taking on large social issues of great public 
importance. Only once did he engage in communal legal work. At the 
request of the activist Jewish lawyer Louis Marshall, Cardozo 
represented, pro bono, the Russian Massacre Fund on the question of 
the disposition of the remainder of the funds that had been raised for 
the benefit of Russian Jews who had suffered as a result of pogroms. 
Other than that, he did no communal work of any sort during his years 
of practice.  
As he entered his early forties, his professional path seemed 
set. Then chance intervened. 1913 was the occasion for a periodic 
convulsion in the New York City political world. A diverse group of 
reformers, anti-Tammany Democrats, and Republicans united to 
produce a joint Fusion ticket in the local elections to try to wrest 
control of the local government from Tammany Hall.  Putting together 
a ticket for the various executive and judicial positions required 
considerable negotiation among the different groups. A subcommittee 
on judges was looking for a Jew to balance the ticket. Cardozo’s name 
was eventually suggested to the subcommittee chair, Charles 
Burlingham, who made the case for Cardozo to the Fusion group.  The 
Fusion ticket was generally successful, and Cardozo, running against 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/7
2018 CARDOZO 13 
an incumbent, barely squeaked through with the aid of some Bronx 
County dissident Tammany Democrats.  
As he took the bench in 1914, he had been a practicing lawyer 
for 23 years. Those practice years had a major impact in preparing 
Cardozo for his judicial career.  
His college and law school education provided a 
substantial amount of intellectual capital and the habits 
of reading and study that lasted his whole life. His work 
matured him socially, and his colleagues soon 
discovered not only his ability but the strength of his 
character and personality. Having lived a sheltered 
personal life, he used his work as his window on the 
world. A good litigator gets to understand people, both 
their strengths and their weaknesses. His work gave 
him firsthand experience with the human condition, 
with human frailty, trickery, and deceit. A good 
litigator also learns a good deal about the subject matter 
of his cases. Cardozo read widely and was more 
familiar with new ideas than most practicing lawyers, 
but he came to the bench with a view of the judge’s role 
as a resolver of disputes, not as a dispenser of legal 
theory. Even though his experience as a judge would 
enlarge his view of the judicial role, Cardozo never lost 
his lawyer’s touch.2 
Cardozo tried cases as a trial court judge for just one month 
before he was appointed by the Governor to fill one of the temporary 
Court of Appeals positions that existed to help that court clean up its 
backlog. Three years later he was appointed and then elected to a 
regular term on the Court of Appeals. Cardozo’s first few years on the 
Court of Appeals were a time of legal ferment. The realist movement 
roiled the academic world, and its critique influenced judicial decision-
making. Some of Cardozo’s early opinions were instant hits. Wood v. 
Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon,3 involving interpretation of a contract with 
an eye to the nature of business relationships, and MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co.,4 found their way very quickly into law school curriculums. 
 
2 ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 112-13 (Harvard University Press 1998).  
3 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
4 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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The latter especially was heralded as an example of adapting ancient 
common law doctrine to the needs of modern industrial society. 
 Cardozo is remembered as one of the judges who brought the 
common law into the twentieth century, a judge who adapted the 
general principles underlying centuries of traditional law to the 
dynamic changes of an industrializing society, a judge who realized 
that the atomized societies of previous centuries were becoming more 
and more interdependent and that law needed to recognize the new 
economic and social reality. While a careful reading of the body of 
Cardozo’s work supports that conclusion, it does not portray the whole 
Cardozo. There was another Cardozo, who gave more weight to, or put 
more burdens on, the other organs of government.  A great many of his 
most famous opinions are matched by an opinion in an analogous case 
in which he did not modernize the law, did not create a new duty to 
reflect changes in society. Cardozo modernized most in situations 
where the way had been foreshadowed, or at least hinted at, in previous 
legislative or judicial action in his own state.  
On the other hand, Cardozo believed that his position as a judge 
in a democratic society counseled leaving the responsibility for law 
reform to the legislature when issues were complex and the 
consequences for change uncertain.  His references in many opinions 
to possible limits on the doctrine being enunciated were not window 
dressing to be ignored in subsequent opinions. Quite often the lawyerly 
ingenuity that expanded a principle enunciated a limitation to the 
principle as well. For example, the seminal opinion imposing liability 
on auto manufacturers to the ultimate buyer of its defective product is 
matched by an opinion refusing to impose liability on a public utility 
to the company whose property was destroyed by fire, allegedly 
because of failure of the water company to supply water at specific 
hydrants.5 Indeed, a series of cases in which Cardozo invoked doctrine 
and policy in support of liability based on foreseeability of risk or 
danger is matched by a series of cases in which he invoked doctrine 
and policy to deny foreseeability-based liability. One can find other 
series of such paired cases throughout the various areas of doctrine that 
he considered during his 18 years on the New York Court of Appeals. 
 In just a few years on the bench Cardozo made a name for 
himself. By 1921 his growing reputation was recognized in three 
distinct ways. He was selected to the Board of Overseers of Harvard 
 
5 Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/7
2018 CARDOZO 15 
University. He was invited to lend his support to a project of the 
Association of American Law Schools to organize what would become 
the American Law Institute, most known for regularly publishing 
“Restatements” of bodies of law such as contracts and torts. Finally, 
he delivered the Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School. Those lectures 
have been read by hundreds of thousands in the succeeding years under 
the title of The Nature of the Judicial Process.6  
Cardozo was the first judge in modern times to try his hand at 
describing what judging was all about. Indeed, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process helped create what has become a cottage industry as 
interest in the subject of judicial decision-making has grown not only 
in the academy but perhaps more importantly among the general 
public.  First Cardozo and then other judges and judicial philosophers 
have written in increasingly theoretical fashion about the subject. 
However, over ninety years later Cardozo’s initial effort is still being 
read, with profit.  
When Cardozo delivered his lectures, the diverse academic 
movement known as “legal realism” was in full flower. A theme of 
that movement was its attack on what it portrayed as a formalist, 
mechanistic approach to judging. The previous half century had been 
characterized for its emphasis on judge-made law as having its own 
internal consistency, with doctrines derived from first principles 
independent of the politics of the day. Judges, it was said, “found” and 
did not “make” law, and they deduced the governing rules in a 
particular case from the decided precedents.  The extent to which that 
portion of the realists’ attack on their predecessors was based on 
inaccurate caricature is still a matter of some debate, but there is little 
doubt that one of Cardozo’s purposes in delivering The Nature of the 
Judicial Process was to acknowledge the importance of sources 
beyond precedent for judicial decision-making as well as the inevitable 
element of “law-making” discretion that appellate court judges 
exercise in close cases.  
Cardozo described four major sources of material for judicial 
decision-making – logic, history, custom, and public policy.7 He 
devoted a lecture to each of these. He treated history and custom as 
more specialized doctrines that were powerful decision-making factors 
only in those relatively few cases when there was enough evidence of 
 
6 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
7 Id. at 30-31.  
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either to be relevant. He regarded logic, the use of deductive analysis 
from principles already established, as having a certain presumption in 
its favor and as governing in the absence of strong arguments from 
history, custom, or public policy. While logic as he defined it was 
backward looking, his incorporation of the notion of deciding by 
analogy also had a forward-looking aspect. 
The bulk of Cardozo’s lectures, however, consisted of analysis 
of the effect of public policy considerations – a normative approach 
based on contemporary values – on judicial decision-making. He both 
endorsed the importance of using law to achieve social justice and 
warned against the dangers that could accompany the abandonment of 
established principles, certainty, and order. Judges were agents of 
change, but not too much and not too often. The trick was to know 
when to innovate and when to refrain. 
Cardozo was no revolutionary. His vision of the judicial role 
was a version of what English and American judges had done for 
centuries, reaffirmed and adapted for modern use. He believed that the 
major role in guiding social change in a democracy belonged to the 
legislature and the executive. Thus, he innovated most when the step 
to be taken was modest and when the innovation did not violate what 
he saw as the prerogatives of other institutions of government – and 
ideally when the legislative or executive branch had already pointed 
the way. While Cardozo often adapted law to new social conditions, 
he also often declined to make such adaptations. Fairness was 
important to him, but he did not believe that judges could always do 
what they thought was fair or just. Cardozo believed that he had to 
respect precedent, history, and the powers of other branches of 
government. Judging involved taking all these factors into account, 
methodically and as impartially as he could.  
A common complaint offered by judges and others is that 
Cardozo’s prescription does not help a judge to decide a particular 
case. Of course not. Indeed, in a way, a subtheme of Cardozo’s lectures 
is that judicial decision-making involves a nuanced approach among 
different considerations, any one of which may be dominant with 
respect to a particular issue or in the context of particular facts. He was 
essentially an accommodationist, but the totality of his messages was 
ambiguous. That ambiguity, I think, has contributed to his enduring 
reputation. How one applies Cardozo to different situations depends 
on what strand of thought is emphasized in different contexts. Even 
judges who subscribe fully to his messages will put the elements of 
10
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decision-making together in different ways in particular cases, each 
side able to cite different Cardozo words for support. 
Cardozo carried forth his prescription into the field of 
constitutional law as well, expressing the view that public policy 
considerations had their strongest justification in that field. Indeed, he 
outlined a controversial view, which he expounded as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, that “the content of constitutional immunities is not 
constant, but varies from age to age.”8  
The Nature of the Judicial Process was not a work of 
philosophy. Although Cardozo was well read in works of philosophy 
and often quoted or cited philosophers to support a particular insight, 
he was not interested in attempting to set out a comprehensive theory 
of judging that was grounded in philosophy. His purpose was to 
explain the art of judging from his perspective as a judge and former 
practicing lawyer. At the end of the Lectures, he issued a word of 
caution about everything he said. While he refused to quarrel with the 
notion that a judge reflects “the spirit of the age,” he was skeptical 
about what that was. “The spirit of the age,” he wrote, “as it is revealed 
to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in which the 
accidents of birth or occupation or fellowship have given us a place.”9  
The years following the delivery and publication of The Nature 
of the Judicial Process saw the transformation of Benjamin Cardozo 
from a well-known judge to a judge with a national reputation. The 
academy lionized him even before he became chief judge of the New 
York Court of Appeals, and the court itself was seen as the outstanding 
state court in the country. It had several notable judges, Cuthbert 
Pound, William Andrews, and Irving Lehman, to name just three, but 
it was Cardozo’s opinions that caught the academic public’s eye and 
were incorporated into law school casebooks throughout the country. 
This was a time when virtually all judges, and not their law clerks, 
wrote their judicial opinions. Cardozo wrote in a distinctive style, with 
many one-liners that sharpened his meaning. Occasionally flowery and 
ornate, at its best the style was crisp and persuasive, and it constitutes 
a large part of the explanation for his continuing popularity in the legal 
academy. He had the knack of making a great case out of what would 
have been humdrum in the hands of most judges. He also had a distinct 
personality. He was well bred, well educated, elaborately courteous, 
 
8 Id. at 82-83.  
9 Id. at 174-75.  
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and his personal kindliness and gentleness in his later years led many 
to refer to the “saintly Cardozo.” But no one who was as successful a 
courtroom lawyer as Cardozo had been could accurately be described 
as a saint. Underneath the gentle demeanor that he later projected was 
a self-confident, ambitious, tough-minded man who looked out for 
himself and those he loved in a conscientious pursuit of success. He 
had the human failings of vanity and prejudice, but he was a good man 
with extraordinary talents.  
Cardozo never married, but his relationship with his older sister 
Nellie provided him with support and warmth as she helped raise him 
in his early years, as they presided together over their family and their 
home, and finally as he took care of her during her long, last illness. 
These experiences helped contribute to his strong personal values of 
duty, honor, and individual responsibility that were often evident in his 
judicial opinions. Cardozo’s family life and his loyalty to his Sephardic 
heritage also reflected a moral and social conservatism that balanced 
his progressive, modernizing instincts. His professional achievements 
during his forty-six years as lawyer and judge would help redeem the 
family name. 
The same balanced approach exhibited on the New York Court 
of Appeals and in The Nature of the Judicial Process between judicial 
innovation and judicial restraint characterized his work during the 
relatively brief period he served on the Supreme Court of the United 
States. I do not have time, in this talk, to do more than note that while 
on the Court he wrote some important opinions, some published and 
some not published, that forcefully defended an expansive notion of 
the importance of the First Amendment. And then more generally 
Cardozo, invoking John Marshall and Oliver Wendell Holmes, took 
sides in the theoretical debate of his day – and indeed of ours as well – 
with those who believed that the open-ended provisions of the 
Constitution were to be reinterpreted in light of changing political, 
social, and economic conditions in the country.  
Finally, Cardozo is remembered for his style. Cardozo’s main 
hobby was reading and he read widely in literature, philosophy, and 
even to some extent in science. He was fascinated by language and its 
ability to convey thought in striking fashion. He employed his love of 
words in a constant effort, occasionally a bit strained, to express his 
reasoning in memorable language.  That unique style helped make him 
known in his day and has helped perpetuate his memory as law 
teachers use his opinions to catch the interest of their students. I have 
12
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ended many a talk I have given about Cardozo by letting him speak for 
himself. I can think of no better way to end a lecture devoted to the 
memory of Cardozo than by quoting some of his more memorable 
words: 
  
“The prisoner is to go free because the constable has blundered.”10 
 
“Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years.”11  
 
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices 
to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”12 
 
“The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic 
may be counteracted by the tendency to confine itself within the limits 
of its history.”13  
 
“Danger invites rescue.”14 
 
“The timorous may stay at home.”15 
 
“The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days 
apace.”16  
 
“A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”17 
 
“One who is a martyr to a principle . . . does not prove by his 
martyrdom that he has kept within the law.”18  
 
 
10 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
11 Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (N.Y. 1928).  
12 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).  
13 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 51. 
14 Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921).  
15 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). 
16 Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931). 
17 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
18 Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 268 (1934).  
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“[Of freedom of thought and speech] one may say that it is the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”19  
 
“[W]e are not to close our eyes as judges to what we must perceive as 
men.”20  
 
“Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow 
advances.”21  
 
“[A] great principle of constitutional law is not susceptible of 
comprehensive statement in an adjective.”22  
 
And finally what I believe to be the most quoted words from my 
biography are not from his judicial writings but rather the words he 
uttered when he performed the marriage ceremony of a relative:  
Three great mysteries there are in the lives of mortal 
beings: the mystery of birth at the beginning; the 
mystery of death at the end; &, greater than either, the 
mystery of love. Everything that is most precious in life 
is a form of love. Art is a form of love, if it be noble. 
Labor is a form of love, if it be worthy; thought is a 
form of love, if it be inspired; and marriage is love 
incarnate. So may it be for you throughout all the years 
to come.23 
 
19 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
20 People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co, v. Knapp, 129 N.E. 202, 208 (N.Y. 1920).  
21 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 133 (Yale University Press 1924). 
22 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936). 
23 Cardozo, Commonplace Book, II, Columbia Cardozo Collection, Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
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